HPN/Reuters: Afghanistan

In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country. Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.

More recent information on Afghanistan on the Civil-Military Relations blog:
Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action - next to Afghan civilians, also international aid workers have been the target of increased terrorist attacks in the country. This raises many concerns in the light of the upcoming presidential elections on 20 August.
Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work - humanitarian organisations diverge in their approach in dealing with the increased insecurity in the country, with the ICRC firmly avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem.

A new pressrelease by Reuters tells about Karzai's plans in his election manifesto to regulate foreign troops in Afghanistan:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai , setting out his election manifesto, has vowed to make foreign troops sign a framework governing how they operate in a bid to limit civilian casualties. Karzai, widely criticised this week for withdrawing from a televised debate with two of his main rivals in the Aug. 20 presidential election, has unveiled a manifesto covering foreign troops, talks with insurgents and reconstruction. Civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO operations, particularly air strikes, have become a source of increasing outrage among ordinary Afghans and their leaders this year, even as insurgent violence hit its worst levels in the eight-year-old war.

More about this in the extended blog entry.
In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country.

Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.

It has been difficult for aid agencies and DFID to focus on reconstruction and development when access to populations is largely determined by which areas are ‘secured’ by British and Afghan military forces. Development here requires longer timeframes and a more sophisticated form of interaction with target beneficiaries. It is also difficult to find technical experts willing to stay on the ground for any length of time in a highly volatile and dangerous environment.

Also, there are two separate foreign military forces present on the ground - the Coalition Forces and the NATO/ISAF operation forces. However distinct, the public does not make a distinction between the two and their actions affect each other, potentially affecting the acceptance of their actions (and, concomitantly, of the aid agencies affiliated to them or operating under their protection). In reaction, several international aid agencies have expressed their desire to decouple aid delivery from military goals and refused to be any longer part of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Further complicating these matters is a general lack of coherency between the major donors, lack of legitimacy of the central government and the fact that in the country as a whole, the lack of good national or provincial data and security constraints on access to beneficiaries impede an accurate assessment of project progress.

Here are some excerpts from the latest news items posted on the Civil-Military Relations blog.

13 July 2009: Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action.

Recent violence has also targeted those trying to help the fledgling democracy rebuild. Last month three national staff members of a local non-governmental organization (NGO) were killed when the vehicle they were travelling in was destroyed by a roadside bomb in Jawzjan province. In addition, the office of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Kunduz was attacked in early June with a rocket-propelled grenade having been fired at the compound.
The ongoing violence is of particular concern as the country gears up for presidential elections slated for 20 August. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA, Kai Eide, has highlighted the critical importance of the upcoming polls, noting that it is about more than choosing the country’s future leaders.

14 July 2009: Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work.

While large swathes of the country, mostly in the south and east, are no-go zones for most agencies, the increasing use of armoured vehicles, barricaded compounds and restrictions on movement have also had an impact on operations in relatively safe areas, such as Kabul, where many organizations recommend armoured vehicles for their staff. [...]
However, some organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prefer not to use them. “Armoured vehicles are both expensive and inconsistent with the nature of our work,” Patrick Hamilton, deputy head of the ICRC delegation, told IRIN, adding that the organisation was more inclined to seek security guarantees for its staff and activities through negotiations with warring parties and host communities. However, the ICRC’s modus operandi is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for other aid agencies to replicate, specialists say. [...]
The ICRC says it will continue avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem. “We seek security through local acceptance and support,” said Hamilton. Others, including Donini, advise aid agencies to negotiate a “humanitarian consensus” with all warring parties and neighbouring countries as the UN did in the 1980 and 1990s. “Immediate steps should be taken to build a relationship of trust with all parties to the conflict,” said Donini.