IRIN: Afghanistan: A tight squeeze on humanitarian space

“In the south, south-east and east, isolated reports were received regarding government officials being forced to bribe insurgent commanders in order to facilitate the continued operation of schools and allow for the implementation of certain development projects. This highlights the heightened ability of the insurgents to exert their authority and influence over the implementation of development activities,” the UN Secretary-General said in a report to the Security Council in December 2009.

Laurent Sailard, director of ACBAR, a consortium of over 100 Afghan and foreign NGOs, said aid workers must not make payments to insurgents for security, access or safe passage.

“Buying a passage for humanitarian convoys or access is a bad strategy with long-term negative impacts. Demands could increase, and if not satisfied could lead to increasing threats. It is a never-ending process that always leads to the worst,” he said, adding that aid workers had to ensure access and security through acceptance among local communities and impartial dialogue with belligerent parties."

Movement policy is not to use armed escorts but gain access by negotiating and being accepted by all parties to a conflict.

Read the rest of the article on the IRIN website and read more on the Movement's position here.

UPDATED 01.02.10 Afghanistan: The London Conference and Yemen meeting

This post will be updated as new news comes in.

• 01.02.10: Final bit of analysis from Daniel Gerstle at Change.org
• 01.02.10: Afghan women urge NATO to remain in Afghanistan long enough to ensure that the Karzai administration will not fall to the Taleban
  
• 01.02.10: Fuller statement from the UK Government now available on Reliefweb.
  
• 28.01.10: Analysis and predictions of a new settlement which will bring the Taleban into government in Afghanistan. Much disquiet from human rights groups and other commentators at the prospect of rehabilitating perpetrators of human rights abuses.
  
• 27.01.10: Reuters reports on the Yemen meeting today, apparently hastily called after a Yemen-based terrorist group claimed responsibility for the failed Christmas US plane bomb. Apparently:

Wednesday's meeting, which brings together the Group of Eight world powers, Yemen's neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, is designed to give a strong signal of support to Yemen, while pushing for economic development and reform. The European Union, United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) will also be represented.

Given the attendees and stated focus, this seems a very Washington Consensus approach - no sign that the plight of the displaced in Yemen will be discussed.


• 27.01.10: Seven NGOs reiterate the negative impact of the militarisation of aid in Afghanistan and urge the London Conference to rethink the increasing tendency of international foreign policy to link development and security activities
  
• 27.01.10: ICRC urges all parties to work to minimise the impact of conflict in Afghanistan on civilians
  
• 26.01.10: IRIN: Humanitarian aid is not something the military can do
  
• 26.01.10: ICRC describes Yemen as 'a serious humanitarian crisis in the making'
  
• 25.01.10: Don't forget Yemen - an additional meeting will be held on Wednesday. Alertnet looks at possible outcomes of both conferences.
  
• 25.01.10: Reuters reports on the draft communique on the future of Afghanistan which includes 'a "framework" for turning the country's security over to Afghan forces' beginning this year, commits Afghanistan to setting up 'an organization to "reach out to insurgents," and the international community to ...channeling more of their aid through the Afghan government and providing debt relief to Kabul.'

BAAG conference on Afghanistan

Ahead of the London Conference on Afghanistan on the 28th January, the British Agencies in Afghanistan Group held a one-day conference at Canada House on the 26th January to contribute an Afghan perspective. Invited speakers included Afghan NGO staff, MPs, and activists, as well as UK-based experts and NGO speakers. Discussions broadly focussed on security and government, although several speakers raised the rights and voices of Afghan women, strikingly absent from the London Conference photo-call. Video from the conference is still to come. Daniel Gerstle of Change.org reflected on a day that had seen nothing very new announced or debated, and asked fellow attendees for concrete recommendations.

Wall St Journal: on the ICRC negotiating UN access to children in Afghanistan

International Committee of the Red Cross, the only international organization that maintains regular communications with the Taliban command, acts as an intermediary every time a new letter of support is issued. That happened 10 times in 2009, each time a new vaccination campaign was launched.

Dr. Mir of the WHO says he decided to ask the International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC, for assistance after watching how that organization facilitated talks between the South Korean government and the Taliban that led to the freeing of 23 Korean hostages kidnapped by the insurgents in July 2007.

...Afghan insurgents generally respect the ICRC's neutrality, unlike their counterparts in Iraq, who blew up the organization's Baghdad headquarters in October 2003. The ICRC maintains first-aid posts in some Taliban-held parts of the country and runs special taxi-ambulance services that evacuate wounded Taliban fighters from the battlefield as well as Afghan civilians caught in the crossfire.

Read more on the WSJ website.

Meanwhile, a new intelligence report proposes that analysts should focus on deep analysis of local social and political structures in Afghanistan:

He also calls for a complete culture change in the intelligence community which will see them forgoing their much loved Power Point slides for "meaty, comprehensive descriptions of pivotal districts throughout the country" produced on word processors.

"Analysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organise it with the skill of librarians, and disseminate it with the zeal of journalists," the report says.

Read more on the Guardian website.

Disasters: New Theme Issue on Reconstruction

ODI has published a new Disasters theme issue, Emerging Perspectives on the Politicisation of Reconstructing Conflict-Affected Countries. This issue tries to bridge the gap between academic reconstruction theories and the local practices:

Studies of reconstruction have, despite being a critical issue for many years, long suffered from an acute disassociation between theory and practice on the one hand and academic and policy circles on the other. Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan have exacerbated these problems, necessitating a thorough and, perhaps most pertinently, critical evaluation of both the state of the debate and the state of the art. This theme issue aims to contribute to such a process of reflection by drawing on evidence from reconstruction efforts undertaken in a wide range of local contexts.

The theme issue contains the following articles:
Emerging patterns in the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries
'Rule of Law' initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicised reform in post-conflict states
Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it
The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka
Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan
A very political reconstruction: governance and reconstruction in Lebanon after the 2006 war

This and other editions of Disasters are available from the BRC library, or online by emailing library@redcross.org.uk.[...].

The first contribution, Emerging patterns in the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries, contextualises the five main contributions to this issue. The overall argument that Tim Jacoby and Eric James make is that the comination of three patterns, 'marketisation', 'politicisation', and 'securitisation', has narrowed the space in which humanitarian and reconstructive interventions into conflict-affected countries are organised and undertaken.

In the second article, 'Rule of Law' initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicised reform in post-conflict states, Jenny H. Peterson talks about how the instrumental use of RoL programming provides further evidence of weaknesses and contradictions within the politicised liberal peacebuilding project (since it increases security in the short term, but threatens the sustainability of peacebuilding reforms in the long run, as seen in Kosovo), necessitating reconsideration of its role in post-conflict transformations.

In Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it, Alpaslam Ozerdem discusses the dangers and pitfalls of DDR in a highly complex and insecure environment such as Iraq.

Benedikt Korf et al. analyse in The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, the perpetuation of the political economy that has driven social conflict and discontent in the post-independence years in Sri Lanka.

The fourth article, Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan, by Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-to-peace transition in Afghanistan.

In the last contribution, A very political reconstruction: governance and reconstruction in Lebanon after the 2006 war, Christine Sylva Hamieh and Roger Mac Ginty examine how in general many Western states and Western-backed international institutions favoured governance programming (software) while many Arab and Gulf State donors preferred physical reconstruction projects (hardware), often with an emphasis on large-scale, high-visibility infrastructure projects. They argue that the latter were able to connect more effectively with the political culture of Lebanon.

HPN: The Role of the Affected State in humanitarian action

Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 43 features articles on the role of the affected state in humanitarian action. Case studies explore the extent to which economic growth, political stability and experience impact on the willingness and capacity of states to manage disaster response. The surprisingly positive role the military has played in supporting effective state-led disaster response is also highlighted and perceptions – often promoted by the media – that only international relief agencies can save lives and alleviate suffering are challenged. The role of the state in humanitarian action is, however, not always positive, as illustrated in articles focused on Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.

Feature stories:
Aid and access in Sri Lanka
The silver lining of the tsunami?: disaster management in Indonesia
When the affected state causes the crisis: the case of Zimbabwe
Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia
Land and displacement in Timor-Leste
Lessons from the Sichuan earthquake

Practice and policy notes
Britain and Afghanistan: policy and expectations
Are humanitarians fuelling conflicts? Evidence from eastern Chad and Darfur
Lessons from campaigning on Darfur
Supporting the capacity of beneficiaries, local staff and partners to face violence alone
Stuck in the ‘recovery gap’: the role of humanitarian aid in the Central African Republic
Out of site, out of mind? Reflections on responding to displacement in DRC
Making cash work: a case study from Kenya

HPN/Reuters: Afghanistan

In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country. Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.

More recent information on Afghanistan on the Civil-Military Relations blog:
Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action - next to Afghan civilians, also international aid workers have been the target of increased terrorist attacks in the country. This raises many concerns in the light of the upcoming presidential elections on 20 August.
Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work - humanitarian organisations diverge in their approach in dealing with the increased insecurity in the country, with the ICRC firmly avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem.

A new pressrelease by Reuters tells about Karzai's plans in his election manifesto to regulate foreign troops in Afghanistan:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai , setting out his election manifesto, has vowed to make foreign troops sign a framework governing how they operate in a bid to limit civilian casualties. Karzai, widely criticised this week for withdrawing from a televised debate with two of his main rivals in the Aug. 20 presidential election, has unveiled a manifesto covering foreign troops, talks with insurgents and reconstruction. Civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO operations, particularly air strikes, have become a source of increasing outrage among ordinary Afghans and their leaders this year, even as insurgent violence hit its worst levels in the eight-year-old war.

More about this in the extended blog entry.
In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country.

Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.

It has been difficult for aid agencies and DFID to focus on reconstruction and development when access to populations is largely determined by which areas are ‘secured’ by British and Afghan military forces. Development here requires longer timeframes and a more sophisticated form of interaction with target beneficiaries. It is also difficult to find technical experts willing to stay on the ground for any length of time in a highly volatile and dangerous environment.

Also, there are two separate foreign military forces present on the ground - the Coalition Forces and the NATO/ISAF operation forces. However distinct, the public does not make a distinction between the two and their actions affect each other, potentially affecting the acceptance of their actions (and, concomitantly, of the aid agencies affiliated to them or operating under their protection). In reaction, several international aid agencies have expressed their desire to decouple aid delivery from military goals and refused to be any longer part of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Further complicating these matters is a general lack of coherency between the major donors, lack of legitimacy of the central government and the fact that in the country as a whole, the lack of good national or provincial data and security constraints on access to beneficiaries impede an accurate assessment of project progress.

Here are some excerpts from the latest news items posted on the Civil-Military Relations blog.

13 July 2009: Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action.

Recent violence has also targeted those trying to help the fledgling democracy rebuild. Last month three national staff members of a local non-governmental organization (NGO) were killed when the vehicle they were travelling in was destroyed by a roadside bomb in Jawzjan province. In addition, the office of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Kunduz was attacked in early June with a rocket-propelled grenade having been fired at the compound.
The ongoing violence is of particular concern as the country gears up for presidential elections slated for 20 August. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA, Kai Eide, has highlighted the critical importance of the upcoming polls, noting that it is about more than choosing the country’s future leaders.

14 July 2009: Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work.

While large swathes of the country, mostly in the south and east, are no-go zones for most agencies, the increasing use of armoured vehicles, barricaded compounds and restrictions on movement have also had an impact on operations in relatively safe areas, such as Kabul, where many organizations recommend armoured vehicles for their staff. [...]
However, some organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prefer not to use them. “Armoured vehicles are both expensive and inconsistent with the nature of our work,” Patrick Hamilton, deputy head of the ICRC delegation, told IRIN, adding that the organisation was more inclined to seek security guarantees for its staff and activities through negotiations with warring parties and host communities. However, the ICRC’s modus operandi is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for other aid agencies to replicate, specialists say. [...]
The ICRC says it will continue avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem. “We seek security through local acceptance and support,” said Hamilton. Others, including Donini, advise aid agencies to negotiate a “humanitarian consensus” with all warring parties and neighbouring countries as the UN did in the 1980 and 1990s. “Immediate steps should be taken to build a relationship of trust with all parties to the conflict,” said Donini.