Friday, July 24, 2009

IDRL: Lessons learnt from H1N1 and humanitarian evolutions in Sri Lanka

Three noteworthy topics signalled by the Federation's International Disaster Response Law programme:


  • On July 5th, experts and representatives of 43 countries concluded the “Top Level Meeting on Influenza A (H1N1): Preparing for the Future”.
  • In Sri Lanka, the Times reported, the government is starting to apply the tax law (0.9 per cent) on humanitarian aid it created in 2006, affecting 89 international and local humanitarian organisations, and potentially amounting to several millions of pounds.
  • Furthermore, Reuters reported that the Sri Lankan government has asked for a reduction or scaling down in humanitarian operations, now that it declared total victory over the LTTE.

Some more information on these topics can be found in the extended blog entry.

On July 5th, experts and representatives of 43 countries concluded the “Top Level Meeting on Influenza A (H1N1): Preparing for the Future”. Some of the findings of this evaluatory meeting:


since international public health emergencies are unpredictable but recurrent and can severely affect human health and economic well-being worldwide, it is essential to reinforce public health capacity in order to permit timely actions to reduce the spread of disease.


Also, the experts and representatives


urged the WHO Director General to continue applying the procedure to determine an "internationally important public health emergency" and formulate the corresponding temporary recommendations.

In Sri Lanka, the Times reported, the government is starting to apply the tax law (0.9 per cent) on humanitarian aid it created in 2006, affecting 89 international and local humanitarian organisations, and potentially amounting to several millions of pounds.


The Government says that the tax is designed to crack down on NGOs that abused Sri Lankan law and squandered their funds on their own staff after the tsunami. Aid workers, however, say the new rules do not grant tax exemption for all the work they are doing — and want to do — to help 300,000 Tamil refugees in army-run camps. Some say the tax contravenes the international disaster response guidelines drawn up by the Red Cross in 2007 with the participation of 140 countries, including Sri Lanka.

However, some of the organisations, including Oxfam and Save the Children, have managed to negotiate their due tax with the government down to 0.1 per cent.
Furthermore, Reuters reported that the Sri Lankan government has asked for a reduction or scaling down in humanitarian operations, now that it declared total victory over the LTTE.


The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said it was shutting down some of its offices in the country following the government's directive. "The ICRC is in the process of reviewing its setup and operational priorities in Sri Lanka," said the ICRC's head of operations for South Asia, Jacques de Maio. "As a first step, it will close its offices and withdraw its expatriate staff from the Eastern Province while winding down its operations in the area," he said. "The ICRC will continue its dialogue with the Sri Lankan government on issues of humanitarian concern."

HPN: The Role of the Affected State in humanitarian action

Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 43 features articles on the role of the affected state in humanitarian action. Case studies explore the extent to which economic growth, political stability and experience impact on the willingness and capacity of states to manage disaster response. The surprisingly positive role the military has played in supporting effective state-led disaster response is also highlighted and perceptions – often promoted by the media – that only international relief agencies can save lives and alleviate suffering are challenged. The role of the state in humanitarian action is, however, not always positive, as illustrated in articles focused on Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.

Feature stories:
Aid and access in Sri Lanka
The silver lining of the tsunami?: disaster management in Indonesia
When the affected state causes the crisis: the case of Zimbabwe
Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia
Land and displacement in Timor-Leste
Lessons from the Sichuan earthquake

Practice and policy notes
Britain and Afghanistan: policy and expectations
Are humanitarians fuelling conflicts? Evidence from eastern Chad and Darfur
Lessons from campaigning on Darfur
Supporting the capacity of beneficiaries, local staff and partners to face violence alone
Stuck in the ‘recovery gap’: the role of humanitarian aid in the Central African Republic
Out of site, out of mind? Reflections on responding to displacement in DRC
Making cash work: a case study from Kenya

Thursday, July 23, 2009

HPN/Reuters: Afghanistan

In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country. Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.

More recent information on Afghanistan on the Civil-Military Relations blog:
Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action - next to Afghan civilians, also international aid workers have been the target of increased terrorist attacks in the country. This raises many concerns in the light of the upcoming presidential elections on 20 August.
Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work - humanitarian organisations diverge in their approach in dealing with the increased insecurity in the country, with the ICRC firmly avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem.

A new pressrelease by Reuters tells about Karzai's plans in his election manifesto to regulate foreign troops in Afghanistan:
Afghan President Hamid Karzai , setting out his election manifesto, has vowed to make foreign troops sign a framework governing how they operate in a bid to limit civilian casualties. Karzai, widely criticised this week for withdrawing from a televised debate with two of his main rivals in the Aug. 20 presidential election, has unveiled a manifesto covering foreign troops, talks with insurgents and reconstruction. Civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO operations, particularly air strikes, have become a source of increasing outrage among ordinary Afghans and their leaders this year, even as insurgent violence hit its worst levels in the eight-year-old war.

More about this in the extended blog entry.
In issue 43 of the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Jon Bennett writes about the the Britain Afghanistan policy and future expectations for the latter country.

Recently, this policy has moved towards a strategy of stabilisation, linking DfID, MoD and the Foreign Office in a mutual strategy of engagement, stabilisation and development, aimed at bridging the counterinsurgency and the "Afghanisation" of the country's future.



It has been difficult for aid agencies and DFID to focus on reconstruction and development when access to populations is largely determined by which areas are ‘secured’ by British and Afghan military forces. Development here requires longer timeframes and a more sophisticated form of interaction with target beneficiaries. It is also difficult to find technical experts willing to stay on the ground for any length of time in a highly volatile and dangerous environment.
Also, there are two separate foreign military forces present on the ground - the Coalition Forces and the NATO/ISAF operation forces. However distinct, the public does not make a distinction between the two and their actions affect each other, potentially affecting the acceptance of their actions (and, concomitantly, of the aid agencies affiliated to them or operating under their protection). In reaction, several international aid agencies have expressed their desire to decouple aid delivery from military goals and refused to be any longer part of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Further complicating these matters is a general lack of coherency between the major donors, lack of legitimacy of the central government and the fact that in the country as a whole, the lack of good national or provincial data and security constraints on access to beneficiaries impede an accurate assessment of project progress.



Here are some excerpts from the latest news items posted on the Civil-Military Relations blog.

13 July 2009: Terrorism kills more Afghan civilians than any other military action.

Recent violence has also targeted those trying to help the fledgling democracy rebuild. Last month three national staff members of a local non-governmental organization (NGO) were killed when the vehicle they were travelling in was destroyed by a roadside bomb in Jawzjan province. In addition, the office of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Kunduz was attacked in early June with a rocket-propelled grenade having been fired at the compound.
The ongoing violence is of particular concern as the country gears up for presidential elections slated for 20 August. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA, Kai Eide, has highlighted the critical importance of the upcoming polls, noting that it is about more than choosing the country’s future leaders.

14 July 2009: Cost of insecurity in Afghanistan impedes humanitarian work.

While large swathes of the country, mostly in the south and east, are no-go zones for most agencies, the increasing use of armoured vehicles, barricaded compounds and restrictions on movement have also had an impact on operations in relatively safe areas, such as Kabul, where many organizations recommend armoured vehicles for their staff. [...]
However, some organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prefer not to use them. “Armoured vehicles are both expensive and inconsistent with the nature of our work,” Patrick Hamilton, deputy head of the ICRC delegation, told IRIN, adding that the organisation was more inclined to seek security guarantees for its staff and activities through negotiations with warring parties and host communities. However, the ICRC’s modus operandi is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for other aid agencies to replicate, specialists say. [...]
The ICRC says it will continue avoiding armed escorts and demonstrating its impartial credentials and emblem. “We seek security through local acceptance and support,” said Hamilton. Others, including Donini, advise aid agencies to negotiate a “humanitarian consensus” with all warring parties and neighbouring countries as the UN did in the 1980 and 1990s. “Immediate steps should be taken to build a relationship of trust with all parties to the conflict,” said Donini.

UK: MoD Strategic Defence Review outlined

On July 07, the Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth announced that a process for undertaking a Strategic Defence Review in the next parliament has been set out.

The purpose is to examine, among others, the lessons learned from recent operations; the changing character of conflict; the requirements on and aspirations of the British Armed Forces.

For some reflections on this announcement, see Charlie Edwards on the Global Dashboard.

Tufts: Development/Conflict Nexus in Nepal

The Feinstein International Center released a new report in June on the connection between aid and violence in Nepal and how they interacted in the last decade. The study was made by Francesca Bonino and Antonio Donini and is part of a wider ongoing research program in Nepal that tackles social transformation, gender and migration issues in a post-conflict environment.
The report explores this question through a retrospective analysis of the development/conflict nexus in Nepal. It looks at the underlying causes of the Maoist success story, in relation to the conditions of structural underdevelopment and violence, and at donors’ policies and activities in Nepal and at their interplay with the conflict environment. The report focuses on the last decade (1996-2008), the period of the Maoist insurgency and of the subsequent largely successful peace process. It looks at the way in which aid actors in Nepal framed their understanding of the Maoist insurgency and how they adapted their responses. It shows that, because the aid community was Kathmandu-centric, it did not fully grasp the nature of caste, class and ethnic discrimination in rural Nepal nor that “development” was not benefiting the most disadvantaged groups. Development failure can thus be construed as a contributing factor to the insurgency.

DfID's new White Paper

On Monday, July 06, the UK government presented its new White Paper on International Development. The paper, Building our common future, focuses on the following areas:
  • poverty reduction
  • promoting economic recovery and greener growth
  • sustainable development
  • building peaceful states and societies
  • keeping up with previous commitments
  • reforming the international humanitarian system
  • improving methods of delivery
For some first reactions by Alison Evans, see ODI's blog. One of concerns raised is that the new white paper lacks strategic selectivity. This may lead to DfID loosing its asset of effectiveness, as it overstretches its capacities (in particular in the current financial environment) in attempting to reach out to all possible humanitarian challenges.

Comments on the high focus on conflict-affected and fragile states have been made by Alex Evans on the Global Dashboard.

Save The Children: Cash transfers crucial in tackling child mortality

A new report by Save the Children, UK, (Lasting Benefits: The role of cash transfers in tackling child mortality), released in June, highlights the benefits that cash transfers may have in reducing child mortality and lifting poor families out of poverty.

As the report indicates,
While more emphasis and resources for the development and strengthening of good-quality health systems are vital, a policy approach that concerns itself only with ‘supply-side issues’ will not succeed in dramatically reducing child mortality. A range of economic barriers prevent families from being able to protect their children from early deaths. [...]
The evidence presented here suggests that well-designed cash transfer programmes can help tackle many of the determinants of child mortality, most immediately by increasing access to healthcare and reducing malnutrition. Across a number of countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, cash transfers have helped poor people to access food and healthcare, and to enhance the status of women (itself one of the most significant determinants of child survival). Contrary to common assumptions, cash transfers also have important positive economic benefits, helping to create livelihood opportunities, increase labour productivity and earnings, stimulate local markets, and cushion families from the worst effects of crises.
These regular cash transfers, the Lancet editorial writes, may prove crucial in realising the 4th MDG (reducing under five child mortality by two thirds).

This report touches upon an area of BRC activities supporting the SARCS to improve access to social welfare grants in South Africa.